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This article discusses the likely Australian copyright implications of an 
increasingly popular form of digital music expression: the music mash-up, a 
majority of which are created from pre-existing audio/sound recordings and 
video without permission of the copyright owner. In examining this issue, the 
analysis of the courts in the recent Larrikin music copyright infringement 
cases are examined. Consideration of the implications of music mash-up 
creation to moral rights is also considered. In the hypothetical scenario that a 
music mash-up artist is accused of copyright infringement, consideration is 
given as to the likely outcome of the application of the fair dealing exceptions 
under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Finally, a suggestion is made as to the 
direction of future law reform in this area. 
I INTRODUCTION 
We now live in the age of the ‘remix culture’. With the advent of widespread 
and accessible digital technology via the internet, there is a permanent and ever-
increasing practice of re-mixing pre-existing works together to create new ones. 
One such practice involves the subject matter of music, where audio/sound 
recordings are digitally blended in lieu of sheet music to form a new digitalised 
musical work, known as a ‘mash-up’.1 Over the last decade a phenomenal shift 
has occurred, so that the once restricted technological capabilities of a select 
few in the music recording industry are now available to millions of amateurs 
worldwide.2 It is now possible for anyone with a home computer, particular 
software and access to the internet to blend pre-existing sound recordings into a 
music mash-up. Technology also makes it possible for an individual to globally 
* BA (Music)/LLB (Hons I). Master in Laws (Research) Candidate, University of New England 
School of Law, Armidale, Australia. 
1 The term ‘sound recordings’ will be used to describe digitalised audio and sound recordings 
throughout this article. 
2 Peter Friedman, ‘Why is Music the Main Battleground in Copyright Wars?’ in Peter Friedman, 
Geniocity.com — Tools and Toys for People Who Think (6 July 2009) 
<http://blogs.geniocity.com/friedman/2009/07/why-is-music-the-main-battleground-in-the-
copyright-wars/>. 
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disseminate their mash-up within a few seconds. One of the most distinctive 
features of a music mash-up is that it typically blends many copyright-protected 
sound recordings (often of different genres) together without the owners’ 
permission.3 
This article seeks to discuss the Australian copyright implications of music 
mash-ups and the defence of fair dealing under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
After discussing in further detail the process of the creation of a music mash-up 
and some of the issues that such a mash-up raises, it will explore the current 
Australian copyright implications of this creative form of digital musical 
expression. The recent copyright infringement cases involving Larrikin Music 
Publishing Pty Ltd and EMI Songs Australia4 will be used to explain the current 
Australian copyright implications of the re-use of music without permission. 
Then this article will discuss the moral rights provisions from pt IX of the 
Copyright Act and their application to music mash-ups, drawing on the recent 
case of Perez v Fernandez.5 
Having engaged in consideration of these moral rights and their application to 
music mash-ups, this article will then investigate some of the exceptions to 
copyright infringement under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), known as the fair 
dealing provisions. It will question whether any of the fair dealing provisions 
might be applicable under Australian law. To do this it will consider the 
hypothetical scenario that an Australian digital mash-up artist is accused of 
copyright infringement, after creating their mash-up from pre-existing, 
copyright-protected sound recordings without permission.  
Conclusions will be drawn and finally a suggestion will be made as to how 
Australian law might address music mash-ups in the future, particularly in light 
of the current Inquiry into Copyright and the Digital Economy by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC).6 In the recently released Issues Paper, one 
of the terms of reference of this review was stated as being ‘the importance of 
the digital economy and the opportunities for innovation … created by the 
emergence of new digital technologies’.7 As explained on the ALRC website: 
‘The ALRC is considering whether exceptions and statutory licences in the 
3 Michael Allyn Pote, ‘Mashed-Up in Between: The Delicate Balance of Artists’ Interests Lost 
Amidst the War on Copyright’ (2010) 88 North Carolina Law Review 639, 640. 
4 Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia (2010) 263 ALR 155 (‘Larrikin’); 
EMI v Larrikin (2011) 276 ALR 35 (‘Larrikin Appeal’); Transcript of Proceedings, EMI v 
Larrikin [2011] HCATrans 284. Throughout this article, when referred to collectively, these 
cases will be called ‘the Larrikin cases’. 
5 [2012] FMCA 2. 
6 ALRC, Copyright and the Digital Economy (30 May 2012) 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/copyright-and-digital-economy>. 
7 ALRC, Copyright and the Digital Economy, Issues Paper No 42 (2012) 3. 
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Copyright Act 1968 are adequate and appropriate in the digital environment and 
whether further exceptions should be recommended.’8 It remains to be seen as 
to whether any of the final recommendations that are made will pertain to works 
of the mash-up genre in general, or whether any might be specific to music 
mash-ups. 
II WHAT IS A MUSIC MASH-UP? 
A A Music Mash-Up — the Technological Continuance 
of a Long-Standing Practice? 
 
From a musicological perspective, in Western music, the creation of new works 
from old ones is not a new concept. For hundreds of years, a common creative 
practice known as ‘music borrowing’ has been documented.9 Composers who 
engage in borrowing practices incorporate a small quantity of music from 
another’s work into their own work.10 Often this small amount of music is 
developed within the new work as thematic material.11 Music borrowing 
practices have been documented to span every musical genre throughout 
history, with some of the earliest examples demonstrated in medieval liturgical 
chants.12  
In the context of the digital era, more people than ever before have the capacity 
to create, distribute and listen to mash-ups. It may be argued that a mash-up is 
an extreme genre of music borrowing — the digital era’s version — where 
borrowing is pushed to the limits when multiple sound recordings are blended 
together to create an entirely new work.13 Mash-ups are situated in a unique 
context because often the person who created them was once their user, listener, 
and therefore consumer. 
The growing popularity of the creation and distribution of music mash-ups 
cannot be underestimated. The music mash-up genre has now attained such 
8ALRC, above n 6.  
9 J Peter Burkholder, Borrowing (2007-2012) Oxford Music Online 
<http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com>. 
10 Ibid. 
11 ‘Thematic material’ is ‘the themes, subjects, motifs, rhythmic figures from which a composition 
is constructed’: Michael Kennedy, Concise Dictionary of Music (Oxford University Press, 4th 
ed, 1996) 734. 
12 Burkholder, above n 9. 
13 Elina M Lae, ‘Mashups — A Protected Form of Appropriation Art or a Blatant Copyright 
Infringement?’ (Working Paper December 2011) 20. 
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global popularity that it has become ‘a widely recognized part of the landscapes 
of popular music and popular culture’.14 The music mash-up genre initially 
gained global attention in 2004, when a United Kingdom-based DJ called 
Danger Mouse released a non-commercial collection titled the Grey Album. The 
works on the Grey Album remixed songs from the Beatles’ White Album and a 
cappella hip-hop vocals from Jay-Z’s The Black Album.15 A cease and desist 
letter was promptly issued by EMI, who were representing the Beatles.  
However, through internet file-sharing websites and worldwide defiance on the 
part of users, listeners and consumers, the Grey Album went viral on the 
internet. An initiative called ‘Grey Tuesday’ was launched through ‘Downhill 
Battle’, a non-profit music-activist organisation, which resulted in over 100 000 
free downloads of the Grey Album in one day, from over 170 websites.16 The 
Grey Album was downloaded over a million times, which would have placed it 
at the top of the charts if it had been a mainstream commercial album.17  
B The Difference between Music Sampling and Mash-
Ups 
Technically, music sampling is the re-use of a short segment of sound recording 
into the ‘sonic fabric’ of a new musical work.18 Music sampling usually 
involves the technological re-use of a small quantity of music and it is a 
common practice in hip-hop music, where an owner’s permission is usually 
sought for the re-use.19 In the United States, the licensing of samples began 
earnestly throughout the record industry in 1991, following a finding of 
copyright infringement by Duffy J in the case of Grand Upright Music Ltd v 
Warner Bros Records Inc.20  
14 Liam McGranahan, ‘Bastards and Booties: Production, Copyright, and the Mashup 
Community’ (2010) 14 TRANS-Transcultural Music Review 
<http://www.sibetrans.com/trans/a13/bastards-and-booties-production-copyright-and-the-
mashup-community>. 
15 Alan Hui, Can Daft Punk Play at My House (BA (Media and Communications) Thesis, 
University of Sydney, 2009) 22. 
16 Aaron Power, ‘Megabytes of Fame: A Fair Use Defense for Mash-Ups as DJ Culture Reaches 
its Postmodern Limit’ (2005) 35 Southwestern University Law Review 577, 580. 
17 Phillip A Gunderson, ‘Danger Mouse’s Grey Album, Mash-Ups, and the Age of Composition’ 
(2004) 15(1) Postmodern Culture 
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/summary/v015/15.1gunderson.html>. 
18 Madhavi Sunder, ‘IP3’ (2006) 59 Stanford Law Review 257, 305. 
19 Olufunmilayo B Arewa, ‘From J C Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and 
Cultural Context’ (2006) 84 North Carolina Law Review 547, 547. 
20 780 F Supp 182 (SD NY, 1991). Ironically, this case did not consider the fair use doctrine. 
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When music sampling occurs, usually a short segment of sampled music is 
incorporated into original music that has been created by the composer.21 In 
comparison, a music mash-up is sampling in an extreme form: a new musical 
work created entirely from the content of two or more pre-existing sound 
recordings, usually through the process of layering.22 This layering usually 
involves ‘overlaying the vocal track of one song onto the music track of 
another’.23 Therefore a mash-up contains no original material and is composed 
entirely from pre-existing works.24 Such works have been described as ‘the 
most overt examples of intertextuality in popular music’.25 Some of the most 
spectacular mash-ups layer, blend and weave sound recordings together so that 
the listener is effectively transported on a musical journey. Listeners can be 
conveyed through many musical genres and snippets of recognisable song 
themes within a single mash-up, which are noticeable through subtle musical 
changes as new samples are blended into the work. 
The variance in the exact re-use and blending of others’ digitalised music 
through layering is only limited by a mash-up artist’s imagination and 
creativity. Therefore in terms of quantity, a very small or a very large portion of 
a sound recording may be re-used. A mash-up could be comprised of the 
blending of a large and substantial portion of only two sound recordings 
(technically known as ‘A + B’), or the blending of a more limited portion of up 
to a dozen or more recordings.26 An example of such a work is ‘Stairway to 
Bootleg Heaven’ by United States artist DJ Earworm, which mashes works by 
Dolly Parton, the Beatles, Art of Noise, Pat Benatar, the Eurythmics, and Laurie 
Anderson.27 Another example is DJ Earworm’s four and a half minute work 
titled ‘United States of Pop (2008): Viva La Pop’, which blends Billboard 
Magazine’s top 25 hits of 2008.28  
21 Newton v Diamond, 388 F 3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir, 2004). 
22 Emily Harper, ‘Music Mashups: Testing the Limits of Copyright Law as Remix Culture Takes 
Society by Storm’ (2010) 39 Hofstra Law Review 405, 406. 
23 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 37 [118], citing The Macquarie Dictionary 
Online (2012) <http://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/anonymous@9c99926873275/-
/p/dict/index.html>.  
24 Pote, above n 3, 646. 
25 Liam Maloy, ‘“Stayin’ Alive in Da Club”: The Illegality and Hyperreality of Mashups’ (2010) 
1(2) Journal of the International Association for the Study of Popular Music 1, 1 
<http://www.iaspmjournal.net>.  
26 Em McAvan, ‘Boulevard of Broken Songs: Mash-Ups as Textual Re-Appropriation of Popular 
Music Culture’ (2006) 9(6) Journal of Media and Culture <http://journal.media-
culture.org.au/0612/02-mcavan.php>.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Graham Reynolds, ‘A Stroke of Genius or Copyright Infringement? Mashups and Copyright in 
Canada’ (2009) 6(3) Scripted 640, 641. 
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It should be noted that many music mash-ups that are available online blend not 
only sound recordings of pop songs, but also the video clips that accompany 
these sound recordings. Such mash-ups are a hybrid of audio and video. 
Therefore the viewer will not only hear the blending of music from the various 
sound recordings, but they will also see a visual mash-up of the music video-
clip footage.29 This type of a mash-up has been described as a ‘music video 
[that] fluidly moves from one song and music video to another’.30 The 
Australian copyright implications of these mash-ups will be discussed later in 
this article. 
C The Creation and Distribution of Music Mash-Ups 
Often the sole motivation for the creation of a music mash-up is a creative and 
artistic one, as opposed to economic incentive. Mash-up artists create their work 
as a form of artistic expression and they often wish to share their creativity with 
the world.31 Sometimes a desire to engage in social or political commentary is a 
catalyst for creation.32 It has been suggested that another motivation on the part 
of some mash-up artists has been to challenge the very notion of copyright law 
itself.33 The music mash-up genre has become so popular that many websites 
have been created where mash-up artists can globally distribute their works and 
users can listen to, download, and rate these works.34 
Currently, a majority of mash-up artists around the world have not released their 
works commercially. For many artists, a fear of litigation due to the re-use of 
works without licence is probably the reason as to why.35 From a legal 
perspective, if a mash-up artist was to receive monetary remuneration for their 
work, this would be problematic. Such a situation may ignite prompt litigation 
29 However, under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), the notated musical score, sound recording and 
video are considered separate works, with separate rights vesting in each: music is classified 
under pt III ‘Works’ and sound recordings under pt IV ‘Subject Matter Other Than Works’. For 
more information about video mash-ups, see Andrew S Long, ‘Mashed Up Videos and Broken 
Down Copyright: Changing Copyright to Promote the First Amendment Values Of 
Transformative Video’ (2007) 60 Oklahoma Law Review 317. 
30 Long, above n 29, 319. 
31 Damien O’Brien and Brian Fitzgerald, ‘Mashups, Remixes and Copyright Law’ (2006) 9(2) 
Internet Law Bulletin 17, 17–9. 
32 McAvan, above n 26. An example of such a mash-up is RX’s work that mashes speeches made 
by George W Bush with U2’s anti-war song ‘Sunday Bloody Sunday’. 
33 Pote, above n 3, 641–2. 
34 Katie Simpson-Jones, ‘Unlawful Infringement or Just Creative Expression? Why DJ Girl Talk 
May Inspire Congress to “Recast, Transform, or Adapt” Copyright’ (2010) 43 John Marshall 
Law Review 1067, 1068. 
35 Harper, above n 22, 410. 
                                                 
2012 MUSIC MASH-UPS: AUSTRALIAN COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS IN THE REMIX ERA 355 
 
from the copyright owners of the music/videos used, who would seek damages 
for copyright infringement and subsequent royalties for this unauthorised re-use.  
However, in the United States, there have been a few exceptions, with some 
mash-up artists deliberately distributing their works commercially to derive 
profit, without having sought clearance for all sampled works. One of the most 
publicised artists is DJ Girl Talk (Gregg Gillis), who has mashed hundreds of 
sound recordings without permission in four commercially distributed mash-up 
albums.36 It is currently unclear as to why individuals such as Gillis have so far 
managed to avoid litigation. Gillis has stated that if he is sued for copyright 
infringement at a future date, he intends to raise the fair use defence, which is an 
exception to copyright infringement in the United States.37 To support this 
defence, he has stated that he aims to rely upon the mash-ups themselves, 
asserting that they sufficiently blend enough works together to create new 
‘transformative’ works.38 
It has been suggested that one reason that more litigation has not occurred 
against commercial or amateur mash-up artists is that copyright owners have 
weighed up the current state of affairs and are fearful of the possible outcome.39 
There is a possibility that if an owner sues for infringement and a court finds in 
favour of the mash-up artist under a legal exception to infringement (such as fair 
dealing in Australia or fair use in the United States), that this would ‘open the 
floodgates’ for the widespread commercial distribution of mash-ups.40 
Although a majority of mash-up artists do not distribute their works 
commercially, there have been some rarer cases where an artist has been offered 
further economic opportunities as a result of the notoriety of a particular work. 
Such opportunities have included: endorsements from website advertising; 
subsequent major-label record contracts (this occurred to DJ Danger Mouse for 
the release of the ‘Gnarls Barkley’ project); or the subsequent licensing and 
official release of a mash-up by the original artist’s label (this occurred to mash-
up artists Phil & Dog for ‘Dr Pressure’).41 Although quite rare, these types of 
scenarios challenge the notion and the meaning of the ‘non-commercial’ 
creation and use of mash-ups. The ALRC’s Issue Paper acknowledges this 
36 Simpson-Jones, above n 34, 1067. 
37 Anna Shapell, ‘“Give Me a Beat”: Mixing and Mashing Copyright Law to Encompass Sample 
Based Music’ (2012) 12(2) Journal of High Technology Law 519, 541. In Australia, a similar 
type of copyright infringement exception is fair dealing, which will be discussed later in this 
article. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Friedman, above n 2. 
40 Ibid. 
41 McAvan, above n 26. 
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issue, stating that there are difficulties present in defining ‘non-commercial’42 
use in the digital era, because such an environment ‘monetises social relations, 
friendships and social interactions’43 and revenue may be received through other 
avenues, such as website advertising.44  
D Music Mash-Ups: Creative Freedom vs Economics? 
From a legal perspective, it is likely that worldwide, a majority of music mash-
ups that are created and distributed online have been created without the 
granting of a licence and the payment of a fee for the portion of sound 
recordings blended.45 While there are some cultural and artistic arguments 
against mash-up artists having to seek consent for the re-use of a sound 
recording, there are also some practical reasons. These include the cost and 
difficulty that a mash-up artist faces in locating the owners of every work they 
wish to use, as well as the cost involved after an agreement is reached on licence 
terms.46 This is particularly difficult if a mash-up artist re-uses many works or 
very popular and therefore expensive works. In many cases the insurmountable 
expense of all of the copyright licence fees alone would prohibit the release of 
such a work.  
The practical difficulties in obeying copyright law and obtaining copyright 
clearance for the use of all samples mashed in a commercial mash-up album are 
immense, as illustrated by the following example. The process of complying 
with the law was described on the website of mash-up artists 2ManyDJs, whose 
record company sought clearance for their 2002 commercial mash-up titled ‘As 
Heard on Radio Soulwax Pt 2’:47 
it’s been almost three years in the making, it took one record company 
employee more than six months of hard labour, 865 e-mails, 160 faxes and 
hundreds of phone calls to contact over 45 major and independent record-
companies. a total amount of 187 different tracks were involved from which 
114 got approved, 62 refused and 11 were un-trackable. it caused massive 
headaches and sweaty palms to employees of ‘clearance centres’ and record 
companies all over the world. but it’s finally here. it’s about 62 minutes long 
and there’s 45 (or is that 46?) tracks on it. it took seven long days and nights 
to cut, edit, mix and re-edit it all together. 
42 ALRC, above n 7, 34 [110]. 
43 Ibid 39 [130]. 
44 Ibid 39 [130]. 
45 Reynolds, above n 28, 646. 
46 Peter Daniel Eckersley, Digital Copyright & The Alternatives: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry 
(PhD Thesis, The University of Melbourne, 2011) 224. 
47 McGranahan, above n 14. 
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The irony in this example is that even though their record company complied 
with United States copyright law and laboriously cleared all the samples used, 
commercial release of the album was still banned.48 This example illustrates the 
extent of the work which is involved in complying with current law. In 
consideration of the current state of affairs, it is very unlikely that an amateur 
mash-up artist would have the financial or logistical means by which to obtain 
licences to clear the copyright of all works mashed. 
Some commentators have suggested that in an artist having to seek permission 
to re-mix works, the situation becomes one of economics versus creative 
freedom, where only those who can afford to pay the licence fees are permitted 
to create.49 Others have suggested that from an infringement perspective, 
current copyright regimes not only contest the music industry against the 
general public but current artists (such as pop singers) against future artists 
(mash-up artists).50 This is because in having to seek permission to use a desired 
sound recording, there is the possibility that a mash-up artist may be refused the 
use of the work by the owner. Accordingly, it has been suggested that a balance 
needs to be achieved between the parties involved.51 The issue becomes exactly 
how to approach this balance. 
In the United States, two opposing points of view have been advanced regarding 
mash-ups. The first is that mash-ups infringe copyright and do not constitute fair 
use.52 The second is that although ‘amateur remix’53 mash-ups currently 
infringe copyright, they should be free from the constraints of United States 
copyright law altogether.54 Some commentators have stated that although non-
commercial mash-ups infringe copyright, due to the widespread, increasing 
practice of creation and online distribution, a compulsory licensing scheme 
should be implemented for ‘transformative sample-based music’.55 Another 
proposal is the introduction of a specific fair use exception to legalise the 
creation of mash-ups.56 However, mash-ups currently continue to infringe 
United States copyright and whether the law regarding mash-ups is reformed in 
the future remains to be determined. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Shapell, above n 37, 547. 
50 Pote, above n 3, 642. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Harper, above n 22, 405–45. 
53 Works that are created and distributed non-commercially. 
54 Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy 
(Bloomsbury Academic, 2008) 254–5. 
55 Shapell, above n 37, 560; Amanda Webber, ‘Digital Sampling and the Legal Implications of its 
Use After Bridgeport’ (2007) 22 St John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 373, 409. 
56 See generally Long, above n 29.  
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Having engaged in a detailed discussion of the creation of music mash-ups and 
examined some of the issues that the creation and distribution of these works 
raise, this article will now turn to discuss the copyright implications of these 
works under current Australian law. 
III WHAT ARE THE CURRENT AUSTRALIAN COPYRIGHT 
IMPLICATIONS OF A MUSIC MASH-UP? 
In order to discuss the current Australian copyright implications of a music 
mash-up, consideration must be given to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and how 
it seeks to protect the types of works that are re-mixed in the process of mash-up 
creation. 
A Copyright Subsistence in Musical Works, Sound 
Recordings and Videos 
First, for the purpose of identification and classification, the Copyright Act 
bestows copyright protection by categorising creative works into eight different 
types of subject matter in two categories:57  
• Part III ‘Works’ includes a musical work, which may pertain to the 
notated musical score.58 Although mash-ups do not tangibly use or re-
mix the actual written musical scores, the underlying principles of the 
law of music copyright infringement is still relevant. Also, as mash-ups 
remix music via technological means, although difficult, theoretically it 
would be possible to produce a tangible notated musical score from a 
mash-up. In relation to a musical work the Act states that copyright will 
subsist as long as the work: is original;59 has been reduced to tangible 
57 Part III ‘Works’ (ss 31–83); pt IV ‘Subject Matter Other than Works’ (ss 84–113C). 
58 Exactly what can be classified as a musical work is a very difficult question and for this reason 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) does not attempt to define it. One of the first judicial attempts to 
define a musical work occurred in the decision of Bach v Longman (1777) 98 ER 1274; 2 Cowp 
623, where Mansfield J stated that music ‘may be written’. See Wellett Potter and Heather A 
Forrest, ‘Musicological and Legal Perspectives on Music Borrowing: Past, Present and Future’ 
(2011) 22 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 137, 146. 
59 Copyright Act s 32. Originality has been defined as ‘being more than a copy of other material’: 
Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, 511 
(Dixon J). 
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form;60 and has a territorial connection to Australia via the notion of a 
qualified person;61 or the first publication first occurring in Australia.62 
• Part IV ‘Subject Matter Other than Works’ pertains to sound recordings 
and cinematograph film (video). As mentioned earlier, both of these 
separate types of works are commonly remixed in a single music mash-
up so that in addition to hearing a blend of various sound recordings, the 
music video footage is also mixed. Section 10 of the Act defines a 
sound recording as ‘the aggregate of the sounds embodied in a record’ 
and a cinematograph film as ‘the aggregate of the visual images 
embodied in an article or thing so as to be capable by the use of that 
article or thing’.63 Therefore, for the purposes of copyright protection 
under Australian law, the sound recordings and accompanying 
cinematograph film (video) that are often blended into music mash-ups 
are considered separate works. This means that although sound 
recordings and videos are blended within a single mash-up, copyright 
subsists separately in each work and therefore they must individually 
satisfy the copyright subsistence criterion. In order for copyright to 
subsist in a sound recording, it must either: be made by a qualified 
person;64 be made in Australia;65 or first published in Australia.66 
Likewise, a cinematograph film must also be either: made by a qualified 
person;67 made in Australia;68 or be first published in Australia.69  
B Copyright Infringement under Australian Law 
Once copyright subsists in a musical work, sound recording or cinematograph 
film, the copyright owner is granted an exclusive bundle of rights:  
• For a musical work, these rights include: the right to reproduce the work 
in a material form;70 to publish the work;71 to perform the work in 
60 Copyright Act s 22. For a musical work, reduction to tangible form may be as a published work 
(s 29(1)(a)) or an unpublished work (s 32(1)). 
61 Copyright Act s 32(4). 
62 Ibid s 32(2)(c). 
63 Ibid s 10. 
64 Ibid s 89(1). 
65 Ibid s 89(2). 
66 Ibid s 89(3). 
67 Ibid s 90(1). 
68 Ibid s 90(2). 
69 Ibid s 90(3). 
70 Ibid s 31(1)(a)(i). 
71 Ibid s 31(1)(a)(ii). 
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public;72 to communicate the work to the public;73 and to make an 
adaptation of the work.74  
• When copyright subsists in a sound recording, the rights bestowed upon 
the owner include: the right to make a copy of the sound recording;75 
the right to cause the work to be heard in public;76 the right to 
communicate the recording to the public;77 and the right to enter into a 
commercial rental agreement in respect of the recording.78  
• For a cinematograph film (video clip), the rights include: the right to 
make a copy of the film;79 to cause the film, its visual images or sounds 
to be heard in public;80 and to communicate the film to the public.81 
Under the Copyright Act, in considering all three types of subject matter, when 
another person exercises the exclusive rights belonging to the copyright owner 
without the owner’s permission, they are committing copyright infringement.82  
In order to establish copyright infringement of a musical work, as summarised 
in the Larrikin Appeal case,83 a three step test must occur: 
(1) The original work in which copyright subsists must be identified; 
(2) Identification in the alleged infringing work of the part copied from the 
original work. This involves an investigation into what has been reproduced 
from the original work. There must be sufficient objective similarity 
(substantiality) and a causal connection between the two works;84 and 
72 Ibid s 31(1)(a)(iii). 
73 Ibid s 31(1)(a)(iv). 
74 Ibid s 31(1)(a)(vi). 
75 Ibid s 85(1)(a). 
76 Ibid s 85(1)(b). 
77 Ibid s 85(1)(c). 
78 Ibid s 85(1)(d). 
79 Ibid s 86(a). 
80 Ibid s 86(b). 
81 Ibid s 86(c). 
82 Ibid s 36 for pt III Works (musical works) and s 101 for pt IV Subject Matter Other than Works 
(sound recordings and cinematograph films). 
83 Larrikin Appeal (2011) 276 ALR 35, 51 [66] (Emmett J), 81 [187], 83 [198] (Jagot J), citing 
Metricon Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd (2008) 248 ALR 364, 369 [23] and 
Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd (2008) 172 FCR 580, 587 [41]–[42]. 
84 Affirming S W Hart & Co Proprietary Ltd v Edwards Hot Water Systems (1985) 159 CLR 466, 
472. 
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(3) Determination as to whether the part taken constitutes a ‘substantial part’ of 
the original work, which primarily involves a qualitative assessment. Of 
consideration is whether the alleged infringing work reproduces ‘that which 
made the copyright work an original work’.85 
To-date, no Australian copyright infringement case has considered the subject 
matter of a music mash-up.86 However, the ultimate finding from the recent 
succession of Larrikin cases is a good example of the current copyright 
implications of the re-use of a small quantity of written music without 
permission.87 Although these cases involved the subject matter of written music 
(as opposed to a sound recording or film), they affirm the current Australian 
legal position on music mash-ups: the unauthorised exercising of an author’s 
exclusive rights in a work such as a mash-up constitutes copyright infringement. 
The analysis of the courts in these cases will now be discussed. 
C Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs 
Australia (2010) 263 ALR 155 
Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd was the owner of Kookaburra Sits in the Old 
Gum Tree (‘Kookaburra’), an iconic Australian round.88 In 2010, Jacobson J of 
the Federal Court determined that two recordings of Men at Work’s Down 
Under (which was owned and licensed by EMI companies)89 had infringed 
copyright in Kookaburra, by reproducing a substantial part of this work.  
After identifying the original work in which copyright subsisted as being 
Kookaburra,90 the court considered the substantiality test to determine whether 
copyright infringement had occurred. The court questioned whether a 
‘substantial part’ of Kookaburra had been reproduced in the flute riff of Down 
Under. An aural and visual comparison of both works was undertaken,91 along 
with the assistance of expert musicologist witnesses.92 Upon a visual 
85 Larrikin Appeal (2011) 276 ALR 35, 51 [66] (Emmett J). 
86 However, there has been a rare case involving a breach of moral rights in a mash-up: Perez v 
Fernandez [2012] FMCA 2, which will be discussed later. 
87 Larrikin (2010) 263 ALR 155; Larrikin Appeal (2011) 276 ALR 35; Transcript of Proceedings, 
EMI v Larrikin [2011] HCATrans 284. 
88 Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 179 FCR 169. 
89 The owners were EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd and EMI Music Publishing Australia Pty Ltd, 
who were the respondents, in addition to Mr Colin James Hay and Mr Ronald Graham Strykert, 
the composers of Down Under and former members of Men at Work: Larrikin (2010) 263 ALR 
155, 159 [24]. 
90 Larrikin (2010) 263 ALR 155, 157 [1]. 
91 Ibid, 174 [158]. 
92 Wellett Potter, Illegal Harmony: Discord between the Practice of Music-Borrowing and 
Australian Music Copyright Law (LLB Hons Thesis, University of New England, 2010) 94. 
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examination of the musical works, Kookaburra is a very short work, comprising 
of four phrases of music. It is also highly memorable because it is a cyclic 
round. In terms of quantity, two musical phrases were reproduced in Down 
Under. The first phrase of the song comprises of only 11 musical notes and it 
was repeated twice in Down Under. The second phrase of the Kookaburra song 
also comprises of 11 notes and it was repeated three times in Down Under.  
Of considerable debate was whether a small musical hook within the flute riff of 
Down Under resulted in a new musical phrase which could distinguish the work 
from Kookaburra.93 This hook was composed by Men at Work and was 
interspersed through the musical phrases taken from Kookaburra. As expressed 
by Jacobson J, ‘[t]he issue of whether there is a degree of objective similarity 
between the works turns very much on the answer to that question’.94  
Ultimately, the court determined that the two bars of music from Kookaburra 
reproduced in the flute riff of Down Under constituted a ‘substantial part’ of 
Kookaburra.95 This was despite the fact that (1) at four bars long, Kookaburra is 
a very short work; (2) being a cyclic round, the work is highly memorable and 
was specifically created so that it could be layered upon itself; and (3) the work 
was copied into a less memorable part of Down Under.96  
In terms of quantity, a very small portion of the Down Under composition 
incorporates the two bars from the Kookaburra work. Down Under comprises 
of a total of 93 bars of music and of this, five bars reproduce part of 
Kookaburra. However, in consideration of substantial similarity, the test is one 
of quality rather than quantity and therefore substantiality was sufficiently 
established.97 
A causal connection between the works was determined from the music video of 
Down Under, where Mr Ham was shown playing the flute riff while sitting in a 
gum tree.98 The established fact that the words to Kookaburra had been sung for 
a period of two to three years in a number of live performances also satisfied the 
causal connection.99 Therefore, as Kookaburra was established to be an original 
93 Larrikin (2010) 263 ALR 155, 158 [18]. 
94 Ibid 158 [19]. 
95 Ibid 191 [337]. 
96 Ibid 191 [339]. 
97 Ibid 160 [42], 162 [54], 179 [218]–[229], affirming IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty 
Ltd (2009) 254 ALR 386, 394 [30], 424 [155], 426 [170]; Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William 
Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273, 294. 
98 Larrikin (2010) 263 ALR 155, 168 [106]. 
99 Ibid 169 [111]. 
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work and was found to be reproduced (through substantiality and a causal 
connection), Down Under infringed the copyright of Kookaburra.100 
D EMI v Larrikin (2011) 276 ALR 35 
On 7 April 2010, EMI appealed the findings of the primary judge to the Full 
Court of the Federal Court. A multitude of arguments were forwarded on behalf 
of EMI as to how the lower court had erred in the application of the law, which 
were outlined in paragraphs 67 and 68 of the judgment.101 The essence of the 
first of these arguments was that the incorrect principles had been applied by the 
lower court during the application of the substantiality test to determine 
infringement.102 In relation to this issue, the Full Court judges were of differing 
opinions. Emmett J found that it was arguable that the trial judge had erred in 
his application of substantial similarity;103 whereas Jagot and Nicholas JJ found 
that the trial judge had not erred in his determination of substantial similarity.104 
Emmett J stated that an error had occurred in the determination of substantial 
similarity because weight was given to the fact that during live performances of 
Down Under, the words to Kookaburra had been sung.105 This finding was used 
in the lower court to support objective similarity between the works.106 Also, the 
trial judge erred by giving weight to the quantitative analysis that half of 
Kookaburra (50%) had been reproduced, when in fact the work was a round, 
containing seven aurally unique bars of music.107 Since Kookaburra was a 
round, it was not necessary for an infringer to reproduce a substantial part of the 
work as a round for substantiality to be determined.108 Additionally, the trial 
judge had engaged in an ‘overly mechanistic’ analysis regarding the objective 
similarity between the works, focusing upon certain musicological elements109 
in isolation to each other and giving more weight to melody than the rest.110 
100 Ibid 161 [49], affirming the copyright infringement test from Francis Day & Hunter Ltd v 
Bron [1963] 1 Ch 587, 623–4 (Diplock LJ). 
101 Larrikin Appeal (2011) 276 ALR 35, 51–3. 
102 Ibid 51–2 [67]. 
103 Ibid 53–6 [71]–[81]. 
104 Ibid 80–90, 96 [185]–[186], [191]–[227], [254] (Jagot J); 98 [263]–[267] (Nicholas J). 
105 Ibid 54 [72]. 
106 Ibid 56 [81]. 
107 Ibid 54 [74]. 
108 Ibid 56 [84]. 
109 Ibid 55 [78]. These elements were listed as being: melody, key, tempo, harmony and structure. 
110 Larrikin Appeal (2011) 276 ALR 35, 55 [78]. 
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Therefore Emmett J stated that the issue of the determination of copyright 
infringement needed fresh reconsideration by the Full Court.111  
However, Emmett J concluded that Down Under had engaged in copyright 
infringement of Kookaburra because a substantial part of Kookaburra had been 
reproduced. 112 As such, the two of the four phrases from Kookaburra that were 
reproduced in Down Under constituted a substantial part of Kookaburra 
because qualitatively they were ‘an essential air or melody of the work’.113 In 
coming to the finding of copyright infringement, he stated that he felt ‘some 
disquiet’ about it, because the taking of the melody of Kookaburra had been 
done ‘by way of tribute to the iconicity of Kookaburra, and as one of a number 
of references made in Down Under to Australian icons’.114 
In the alternative, Jagot and Nicholas JJ disagreed with Emmett J’s finding that 
the trial judge had erred in the way in which he had established substantial 
similarity between the works.115 Rather, they stated that the correct test of the 
‘ordinary, reasonably experienced listener’116 had been identified by the trial 
judge and was correctly applied to determine the objective similarity between 
the works.117 In all other actions in considering objective similarity between the 
works, the trial judge did not err and therefore no error of principle had been 
demonstrated.118 Therefore, they found that the Full Court need not disturb the 
findings of the lower court in regards to copyright infringement. 
Nicholas J affirmed that in undertaking the substantiality assessment as to the 
quality of the original work, it is necessary to establish that the work originated 
with the author.119 This is because the reproduction of work that does not 
originate with an author is an insubstantial part of the work.120 In consideration 
of the first two bars of Kookaburra, they amounted to a substantial part of the 
work.121 Nicholas J also found that EMI had wrongly assumed the subsistence 
111 Ibid 53–6 [71]–[81]. 
112 Ibid 60 [98]. 
113 Ibid 47, 57, 59 [49], [85], [97], applying Hawkes and Son (London) Ltd v Paramount Film 
Service Ltd [1934] Ch 593, 609. 
114 Larrikin Appeal (2011) 276 ALR 35, 60 [99]. 
115 See above n 104. 
116 Larrikin Appeal (2011) 276 ALR 35, 71, 80 [145], [180] (Jagot J).  
117 Ibid 71 [145] (Jagot J). 
118 Ibid 88 [218] (Jagot J). 
119 Ibid 98 [265].  
120 Ibid 98 [265], affirming IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 458, 
475 [37] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ); Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) 
Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 465, 481 (Lord Pearce).  
121 Larrikin Appeal (2011) 276 ALR 35, 98 [265].  
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of originality in Kookaburra because they had relied on it as being a particular 
type of musical work: a round.122 Rather, originality subsisted in the work 
because it arose from ‘independent intellectual effort’ of composer Miss Marion 
Sinclair.123 Therefore, for substantial similarity to be found, all that was needed 
was a qualitative determination that a substantial part of Kookaburra had been 
reproduced and this had been satisfied.124 
The essence of the second argument of appeal advanced on behalf of EMI was 
that the trial judge had become ‘sensitised by the evidence to the similarity 
between the respective melodies’.125 Emmett and Jagot JJ (with whom 
Nicholas J agreed) found that although the trial judge had become sensitised to 
the similarities between the works, in examining the relevant parts of the works, 
listening to the works and relying upon and accepting the advice of expert 
musicologists, no errors in principle had been made.126 Jagot J stated that the 
use of expert evidence in determining objective similarity was very common 
and that no error could be found purely on the basis that a trial judge relied on 
expert evidence.127 
In consideration of the findings, the Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed 
the appeal and unanimously upheld the Federal Court decision regarding 
copyright infringement of Kookaburra.128 
E Application for Special Leave to Appeal Before the 
High Court 
Following the unanimous finding in favour of Larrikin in the Full Federal Court, 
on 7 October 2011, EMI sought application for special leave to appeal before 
the High Court.129 Gummow and Bell JJ of the High Court presided over the 
special leave application. Three grounds of appeal were forwarded: 
(1) In assessing whether a substantial part of Kookaburra had been reproduced 
in Down Under, instead of comparing both works in their totality as whole 
works, the court had incorrectly ‘departed from the statute’.130 This was because 
122 Ibid 98 [263]. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid 98–9 [263]–[267]. 
125 Ibid 51–2 [67] (Emmett J). 
126 Ibid 57 [86] (Emmett J), 84 [202] (Jagot J). 
127 Ibid 84 [202]. 
128 Ibid 61 [104] (Emmett J); 95 [253] (Jagot J); 96 [254] (Nicholas J). 
129 Transcript of Proceedings, EMI Songs Australia Pty Ltd v Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd 
[2011] HCATrans 284. 
130 Ibid (J T Gleeson) (during argument). 
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a narrow scope of comparison was demonstrated through the examination of 
objective similarity between the first two bars of Kookaburra and the flute riff 
of Down Under, instead of between the whole of both works.131 
(2) The reliance upon expert musicologists to determine substantial similarity 
between the first two bars of Kookaburra and the flute riff in Down Under was 
erroneous. The determination of substantial similarity between the two works 
was insufficient to establish reproduction because the similarities could only be 
determined after being educated by these expert witnesses.132 
(3) As Emmett J stated in the appeal, the flute riff in Down Under had engaged 
in a process of quotation of two bars of Kookaburra as a type of tribute to 
Kookaburra and as an act of Australian iconicity.133 Therefore it was argued 
that this act of tribute had ‘involved a sufficient degree of transformation of the 
part taken from the first work so as to place it within the territory of legitimate 
appropriation outside the statutory monopoly’.134 
However, upon consideration of these grounds of appeal, the High Court 
refused special leave to appeal and costs were awarded to Larrikin. The court 
stated: ‘We are not satisfied that any question of principle respecting copyright 
infringement in musical works would be presented upon an appeal in this case 
rather than questions to the application of settled principle to the particular 
facts.’135 Therefore the finding of music copyright infringement was affirmed.  
By analogy, the ultimate finding of music copyright infringement would likely 
apply to a music mash-up. These cases are indicative of a rather poor outlook, in 
considering the hypothetical event that a mash-up artist is accused of copyright 
infringement under Australian law. This is particularly so in consideration of the 
application of the substantiality test to any mash-up. This is because most mash-
up artists seek to blend a highly recognisable (often the most highly 
recognisable portion of music) from another’s work into their mash-up. An 
identifiable portion of music needs to be blended into the mash-up so that it is 
recognisable as having come from an original work. 
Therefore, relying on a qualitative application of the test (as occurred in the 
Larrikin cases), the very selection of any sound recording used within a mash-
up is likely to satisfy substantiality and lead to a finding of infringement. In 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Larrikin Appeal (2011) 276 ALR 35, 60 [99] (Emmett J). 
134 Transcript of Proceedings, EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited v Larrikin Music Publishing Pty 
Ltd [2011] HCATrans 284 (J T Gleeson) (during argument). 
135 Ibid (Gummow J).  
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conclusion, prima facie, under Australian law, a mash-up artist who re-uses a 
sound recording or cinematograph film (video) without permission is infringing 
copyright. 
Having discussed the current copyright implications of the creation of music 
mash-ups in Australia, the issue of the application of moral rights to music 
mash-ups will now be considered. 
F Music Mash-Ups and Moral Rights under Australian 
Law 
Under the Copyright Act, another issue for consideration in relation to the 
creation of a music mash-up is whether this type of work could potentially 
infringe any of the moral rights of the composers of the works mashed. In 
December 2000, the Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 (Cth) 
introduced moral rights into the Copyright Act in order to better conform to the 
Berne Convention.136 Moral rights are additional137 to the economic rights of a 
work (discussed under copyright infringement) and moral rights always vest in 
the individual author of a work.138 
Currently, the author of a written musical work or a cinematograph film (music 
video) that is mashed in some music mash-ups would possess particular moral 
rights under the Copyright Act. An ‘author’ in relation to a film is defined as the 
maker of the film.139 There are no moral rights for the creators of sound 
recordings. Specifically, under pt IX of the Copyright Act, there are three types 
of moral rights: (1) the right of attribution (the right to be credited for their 
work);140 (2) the right against false attribution (so that the work is not falsely 
attributed);141 and (3) the right of integrity (so that the work is not represented in 
a derogatory way).142 
In relation to the right of attribution, under the Act, most music mash-ups 
engage in an attributable act involving a musical work by: (1) reproducing the 
work in a material form (albeit in segments);143 (2) publishing the work (via the 
136 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature 9 
July 1886, 943 UNTS, 178 (entered into force 1 March 1978). 
137 Copyright Act s 192(1). 
138 Ibid s 190. 
139 Ibid s 189. 
140 Ibid s 193. 
141 Ibid s 195AC. 
142 Ibid s 195AI. 
143 Ibid s 194(1)(a). 
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internet);144 (3) performing the work in public (via the internet);145 
(4) communicating the work to the public (via the internet).146 Likewise, most 
music mash-ups engage in an attributable act involving cinematograph film 
(music video) by: (1) making a copy of a film (albeit in segments);147 and 
(2) communicating this to the public (via the internet).148 Therefore under s 193, 
the author of a musical work or film used in a music mash-up is entitled to a 
right of attribution, through sufficient identification. Identification may occur 
through any ‘reasonable form’ of identification,149 in a clear and prominent 
way,150 so that it is noticeable.151 Most music mash-ups already conform to this 
right because they identify and acknowledge in writing the name of the works 
and authors of any works mashed. 
In relation to an author’s rights against false attribution of their authorship in a 
musical work, an act of false attribution includes: (1) to insert, affix or authorise 
the inserting or affixing of another’s name other than the author on the work or 
a reproduction of the work;152 (2) to falsely imply that a person is the author of a 
work;153 (3) to falsely imply that a work is an adaptation of a work of the 
author;154 (4) to deal with a work with a false author’s name inserted, if the 
attributor has knowledge of this fact;155 (5) to deal with a reproduction of a 
work with the knowledge that a false author’s name has been attributed;156 and 
(6) to perform the work in public or communicate it to the public with the 
knowledge that a false author has been attributed to the work.157 If a music 
mash-up draws upon a written musical work, most would not engage in false 
attribution of authorship. Rather, most mash-ups engage in some type of 
identification and attribution of any of the works mashed. 
When considering an author’s rights against false attribution of their authorship 
in a film,158 acts of false attribution for the director, producer or screenwriter 
144 Ibid s 194(1)(b). 
145 Ibid s 194(1)(c). 
146 Ibid s 194(1)(d). 
147 Ibid s 194(3)(a). 
148 Ibid s 194(3)(c). 
149 Ibid s 195. 
150 Ibid s 195AA. 
151 Ibid s 195AB. 
152 Ibid s 195AD(a). 
153 Ibid s 195AD(a)(i). 
154 Ibid s 195AD(a)(ii). 
155 Ibid s 195AD(b). 
156 Ibid s 195AD(c). 
157 Ibid s 195AD(d). 
158 Ibid s 195AC. 
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include: (1) inserting, affixing or authorising another to insert or affix a person’s 
name on the film or copy as to imply false authorship;159 (2) to deal with a film 
in that situation with the knowledge that false attribution of authorship has 
occurred;160 and (3) to communicate the film to the public as a work of false 
authorship.161 Once again, most mash-ups already conform to this requirement 
because they normally attribute correct authorship to the works that they have 
mashed. A majority of music mash-ups also acknowledge that they have altered 
all of the works drawn upon through the mash-up process. 
In considering the three types of moral rights provisions in relation to music 
mash-ups, the most interesting is found in ss 195AI and 195AL, which pertains 
to the right of integrity in a musical work or cinematograph film. An author has 
a right of integrity of authorship in respect of their work,162 which involves their 
work not being subjected to derogatory treatment.163 Derogatory treatment in 
relation to a musical work is: (1) the doing of anything that relates to the 
distortion, mutilation or material altercation to the work that is prejudicial to the 
author’s honour or reputation;164 or (2) the doing of anything else in relation to 
the musical work that is prejudicial to the author’s honour or reputation.165 
Likewise, derogatory treatment in relation to a film is: (1) the doing of anything 
that results in a material distortion of, the mutilation of, or a material alteration 
to, the film that is prejudicial to the maker’s honour or reputation;166 or (2) the 
doing of anything else that is prejudicial to the honour or reputation to the 
maker of the film.167 
The issue therefore becomes whether music mash-ups could be considered to be 
infringing upon an author’s right of integrity in respect of their work through the 
constant distorting and altering of the work that is prejudicial to the maker’s 
honour or reputation. Although music mash-ups engage in a lot of distortion and 
alteration of films (as music videos) and music (in the form of a written musical 
work) it is unlikely that a majority of mash-ups could be found to be ‘prejudicial 
to the maker’s honour or reputation’. Rather, many mash-up artists may argue 
that their works are a homage to the original artists and therefore do not infringe 
the moral right of integrity. 
159 Ibid s 195AF(2)(a). 
160 Ibid s 195AF(2)(b). 
161 Ibid s 195AF(2)(c). 
162 Ibid s 195AI(1). 
163 Ibid s 195AI(2). 
164 Ibid s 195AJ(a). 
165 Ibid s 195AJ(b). 
166 Ibid s 195AL(a). 
167 Ibid s 195AL(b). 
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Interestingly, the recent Federal Magistrate’s Court case of Perez v 
Fernandez168 discussed the scope of the moral right of integrity. In this case, the 
court found that the mashing of an artist’s work into a music mash-up infringed 
this right, because the use of the work was prejudicial to the author’s reputation. 
The facts of this case are as follows. The applicant, Mr Perez, an international 
recording artist known as ‘Pitbull’, authored a sound recording and musical 
work titled Bon Bon, which was released in the United States but not in 
Australia.169 Under the Copyright Act, as the author of this work, Mr Perez was 
entitled to the moral right of integrity of authorship for his written work (the 
Bon Bon Song), as distinct from the sound recording.170 In 2008, Mr Fernandez, 
the respondent and an Australian DJ and promoter, obtained a sound recording 
known as an ‘audio drop’ in connection with the promotion of an upcoming 
Australian tour. The tour was subsequently cancelled and was the subject of 
separate litigation for breach of contract.171  
The audio drop was very short in duration. It contained Mr Perez stating 
‘Mr 305 and I am putting it down with DJ Suave’.172 Mr Fernandez mashed this 
audio drop into the beginning of his MP3 recording of Bon Bon via audio 
editing software to use as promotional material for the upcoming tour.173 This 
mashed version of the work was subsequently uploaded onto a website, where it 
remained for approximately a month, during which time it was streamed to the 
computers of people who visited the website.174 Mr Fernandez also played this 
mashed version at nightclubs in Perth, where listeners were unfamiliar with the 
original version of Bon Bon.175 
The court determined that the mashed version made ‘it sound to the listener like 
Mr Perez … [was] … positively referring to Mr Fernandez at the beginning of 
the song, and that this reference forms part of the original work’.176 This is 
because ‘305’ was commonly known to Mr Perez’s fans as an alter ego name 
for himself and ‘DJ Suave’ was a codename name for Mr Fernandez. 
Subsequently, Mr Perez sued for infringement of his moral right of integrity of 
authorship under s 195AI and sought compensatory and additional damages, 
168 [2012] FMCA 2. 
169 Ibid 1 [1], 2 [4] (Driver FM). 
170 Ibid 3 [13]. 
171 Ibid 5 [37]. 
172 Ibid 4 [28]. 
173 Ibid 5 [31]. 
174 Ibid 5 [34]. 
175 Ibid 14 [59]. 
176 Ibid 16 [65]. 
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including aggravated damages for moral rights infringement, interest and 
costs.177  
The court found that the mashing of the sound recording amounted to a material 
‘distortion’ or alteration and was prejudicial to Mr Perez’s honour or reputation 
under s 195AJ.178 In examining the mashing of the works, the court determined 
that a prominent part of the original work had been deleted and replaced with 
words that gave the entire work a different context, involving Mr Fernandez as a 
subject and author of the song.179 The references in the audio drop to Mr Perez’s 
alter ego were also found to have attracted particular listener attention, thereby 
distorting or mutilating the work.180  
Two grounds were found by the court to support the mashed work being 
prejudicial to Mr Perez’s honour or reputation. First, the work had not been 
released in Australia when infringement occurred via the online streaming — 
the work had only just been released in the United States.181 Therefore some 
listeners would have been misled to assume that the mashed version online was 
the original work, thereby inferring a connection between Mr Perez and Mr 
Fernandez.182 The court placed emphasis on the evidence submitted that ‘the 
associations between artists and DJs in the hip-hop/rap genre are highly 
significant’ and that any perceived connection between the artists may have 
been prejudicial to Mr Perez’s reputation.183 Alternatively, the court found that 
even if this were not the case that Mr Perez considered that this association was 
prejudicial to his reputation and caused him anger and distress.184 
Secondly, the court found that there would have been listeners who were more 
acutely aware of the works of Mr Perez and Mr Fernandez. Such listeners would 
be likely aware of the litigation between the artists and would ‘understand the 
alterations to the song made by Mr Fernandez to be mocking Mr Perez’s 
reputation’.185 Subsequently, the court determined that Mr Fernandez had 
infringed Mr Perez’s moral right of integrity.186 Therefore the court affirmed 
that in order to find infringement of an author’s moral right of integrity, all that 
177 Ibid 7 [42]. 
178 Ibid 21 [85]–[86]. 
179 Ibid 21 [84]. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid 21 [86]. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid 22 [87]. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid 22 [88]. 
186 Ibid 27 [108]. 
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is required is the finding that an infringing act is prejudicial to an author’s 
honour or reputation; the proof of actual damage to the author is not required.187 
The moral rights infringement defence of reasonableness under s 195AS was 
found to be inapplicable in this case.188 In fact, the court found that in 
examining the matters that related to this defence under s 195AS(2), the harm 
caused by Mr Fernandez’s actions was highlighted.189 This included: (1) the 
nature of the work, which existed in a genre where associations between artists 
was significant;190 (2) the purpose of the use of the work, which was to either 
falsely promote Mr Fernandez or to mock Mr Perez in retribution;191 and (3) the 
manner and context of the breach, involving global streaming from a website 
and the relationship between the parties.192 
In discussing the awarding of damages for breach of the moral right of integrity 
under s 195AZA(1) of the Copyright Act, the court considered Mr Perez’s 
reputation as an artist and the harm caused by Mr Fernandez’s conduct.193 This 
included compensation for injured feelings and vindication of an artist through 
aggravated damages.194 The court also considered Mr Fernandez’s conduct 
during litigation.195 In consideration of appropriate damages, the court awarded 
Mr Perez $10 000.196 
In conclusion, as demonstrated by this recent case, it is possible a music mash-
up may infringe an author’s moral rights, particularly the moral right of integrity 
in a written musical work or a film (video clip).Therefore mash-up artists need 
to ensure that the way in which they mash their works could not be considered 
to be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author of the musical work or 
maker of the film.197 
187 Ibid 24 [95]–[97]. 
188 Ibid 22 [89]. 
189 Ibid 22 [89] (a)–(c). 
190 Ibid 22 [87]. 
191 Ibid 22 [87]–[88]. 
192 Ibid 22 [89] (a)–(c). 
193 Ibid 26 [103]. 
194 Ibid 26 [104], applying Meskenas v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd (2006) 70 IPR 172. 
195 Perez v Fernandez [2012] FMCA 2, 26 [104]. 
196 Ibid 27 [107]. 
197 Copyright Act s 195AJ (musical works); s 195AL (cinematograph film). 
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G Not All Copying or Re-Use is Illegal 
From a copyright perspective, it must be noted that not all copying or re-use of 
music, sound recordings or video is illegal. Under Australian law, if a digital 
mash-up artist was able to re-use music, sound recordings or video from the 
following sources, they may avoid a copyright infringement finding at a later 
date: 
(1) Material from the public domain, where copyright had expired.198 However, 
in Australia, it is often difficult to ascertain whether a work has fallen into the 
public domain because no formal registry exists. Sound recordings in which 
copyright has expired are those that were made before 1 January 1955; 
otherwise the current duration of copyright subsists until the end of 70 years 
after the end of the calendar year in which the recording is first published.199 
Therefore modern digitalised sound recordings would not have exceeded the 
duration of copyright, due to their limited age, so this is an unlikely avenue of 
resources. The duration of copyright for cinematograph films (videos) is also 70 
years from the end of the calendar year in which the film was first published.200 
(2) Material that was the subject of an open licence, which may be re-used upon 
adherence to licensing permissions and restrictions.201 An example of an open 
licence is a Creative Commons licence.202 Creative Commons licences are 
becoming increasingly popular in Australia, particularly in relation to electronic 
documents. A good example of this is the Australian government, who formally 
replaced Crown Copyright on government publications with Creative Common 
licences in 2010.203 A mash-up artist may be able to utilise a sound recording or 
video under a Creative Commons licence, as long as they satisfied the licensing 
conditions stipulated.204 The compulsory condition for all Creative Commons 
198 As stated in the Australian Copyright Council Information Sheet — Duration of Copyright 
Fact Sheet G023v16 (February 2012): ‘Once copyright has expired, anyone may use that 
material without needing copyright clearances or permissions.’ 
199 Ibid s 93. 
200 Ibid s 94(2). 
201 See generally, Lawrence Liang, A Guide to Open Content Licenses (Piet Zwart Institute, 
Amsterdam, 2004). 
202 Creative Commons Australia, About the Licences <http://creativecommons.org.au/learn-
more/licences>. 
203 For further information see Anne M Fitzgerald, Neale Hooper and Brian F Fitzgerald, ‘The 
Use of Creative Commons Licensing to Enable Open Access to Public Sector Information and 
Publicly Funded Research Results: An Overview of Recent Australian Developments’ in 
Danièle Bourcier, Pompeu Casanovas, Mélanie Dulong de Rosnay and Catharina Maracke (eds), 
Intelligent Multimedia: Managing Creative Works in a Digital World (European Press 
Academic Publishing, 2010) 151–74. 
204 Cheryl Foong, Creative Commons and the Digital Economy (21 September 2012) Creative 
Commons Australia <http://creativecommons.org.au/weblog/entry/3688>. 
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licences is attribution (credit to the original author and any other nominated 
parties, with a link to the source).205 
(3) Material that was found to satisfy one of the statutory special exceptions,206 
which includes the Copyright Act’s fair dealing provisions.207 These provisions 
will now be discussed in consideration of music mash-ups. 
IV FAIR DEALING AND MUSIC MASH-UPS 
Fair dealing provides a boundary in which copyright law operates. In a number 
of common law jurisdictions around the world, fair dealing may be used as a 
complete defence when a copyright infringement allegation is made.208 If fair 
dealing is determined by the court to be applicable to a particular work, then no 
finding of copyright infringement can be found (ie permission did not need to be 
sought for the re-use of the work and license fees/royalties paid). 
It must be highlighted that in a copyright infringement case, before considering 
whether the use of a work could be a fair dealing, the court has to have already 
determined that the taking of a substantial part of the work has occurred without 
permission.209 This is because the use of an insubstantial part of a work does not 
constitute copyright infringement and fair dealing is only considered after 
copyright infringement has been established. 
Substantiality will likely pose a significant hurdle for any music mash-up; it is 
impossible to provide a standard formula as to what a court would consider 
permissible, or what would be deemed excessive. It is likely that many mash-
ups would fail on the grounds of substantiality, particularly those that mash a 
limited number of works. This is because from a quantitative point of view, the 
more limited number of works used in a mash-up, the more likely that it would 
be a larger quantity of that work used. Additionally, from a qualitative 
perspective, any mash-up will likely have used the most recognisable portion of 
other works so that the re-use is recognisable. As affirmed in the Larrikin cases, 
205 Creative Commons Australia, above n 202. 
206 These include special provisions for educational institutions: Copyright Act s 200AB(3), 
libraries: s 200AB(2), governments; pt VII div 2, private copying exceptions; ss 43C, 111, and 
special cases. 
207 For a comprehensive list of the many special exceptions under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
see Australian Copyright Council, Exceptions to Copyright — Fact Sheet G121v01 (July 2012) 
Australian Copyright Council <http://www.copyright.org.au/find-an-answer/browse-by-a-z/>.  
208 Jurisdictions include Canada, Singapore, New Zealand, South Africa and the United Kingdom. 
209 Sam Ricketson, Megan Richardson and Mark Davison, Intellectual Property: Cases, Materials 
and Commentary (LexisNexis, 4th ed, 2009) 394. 
                                                 
2012 MUSIC MASH-UPS: AUSTRALIAN COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS IN THE REMIX ERA 375 
 
infringement will be found if it is determined that a substantial part of a 
copyright-protected work has been taken without permission. 
A The Difference between Fair Dealing and Fair Use 
Fair dealing in Australia differs to the United States copyright infringement 
exception of fair use210 — a much more generalised defence which permits 
significantly broader use of material.211 It is for this reason that particular uses 
that would be permissible as being ‘fair’ in the United States would most likely 
be rejected under current Australian law. In the United States, four factors are 
considered in determining whether fair use applies. These factors are: (1) The 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is for commercial 
or non-profit purposes. This criterion examines whether a transformative use 
has occurred – transformative use will be discussed in further detail later; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for, or value of the copyrighted work. When 
considering these factors in relation to a non-commercial music mash-up, there 
is a strong possibility that such works would satisfy the fair use exception under 
Untied States law. 
In Australia in 2005, a governmental inquiry occurred into the possibility of 
enacting a broader, United States type of fair use exception.212 However, 
although a new exception was introduced for the purpose of parody or satire, the 
existing restrictive approaches were ultimately favoured over a new broader and 
more open-ended American-style of provision.213 Interestingly, seven years 
later, once again this issue is under consideration through the current ALRC 
inquiry for Copyright and the Digital Economy. The question as to whether 
210 Copyright Act, 17 USC § 107 (1976). 
211 See for example, Universal City Studios v Sony Corporation, 464 US 417 (1984); Hustler 
Magazine Inc v Moral Majority Inc, 606 F Supp 1526 (CD Cal, 1985); Wright v Warner Books 
Inc, 953 F 2d 731 (2nd Cir, 1991); Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, 510 US 569 (1994); Religious 
Technology Center v Pagliarina, 908 F Supp 1353 (ED Va, 1995); Monster Communications 
Inc v Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc, 935 F Supp 490 (SD NY, 1996); Leibovitz v Paramount 
Pictures Corporation, 137 F 3d 109 (2nd Cir NY, 1998); Kelly v Arriba-Soft, 336 F 3d 811 (9th 
Cir, 2003); Bill Graham Archives v Dorling Kindersley Ltd, 448 F 3d 605 (2nd Cir, 2006); Field 
v Google Inc, 412 F Supp 2d 1106 (D Nev, 2006); Perfect 10 Inc v Amazon.com Inc, 508 F 3d 
1146 (9th Cir, 2007); Warren Publishing Co v Spurlock d/b/a Vanguard Productions, 645 F 
Supp 2d 402 (ED Pa, 2009). 
212 Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions: An Examination 
of Fair Use, Fair Dealing and Other Exceptions in the Digital Age’ (Issues Paper, Attorney-
General’s Department, 5 May 2005). 
213 See Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘Of Copyright, Bureaucracies and Incoherence: Stepping Back 
from Australia’s Recent Copyright Reforms’ (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review 967. 
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Australian law should be amended to include a broader, more flexible fair use 
exception to infringement has been listed for inquiry.214 It will be interesting to 
observe whether such reform is finally recommended and whether music mash-
ups could be accepted under such an exception. 
B Fair Dealing 
In relation to the current Australian fair dealing provisions, ss 40 to 42 of the 
Copyright Act outline the fair dealing provisions for musical works. Sections 
103A to 103C outline these provisions for audio-visual items (including sound 
recordings and cinematograph films). These provisions allow the re-use of these 
works, as long as the use complies with specific purposes. In this way, the 
provisions seek to achieve a balance between the rights of copyright owners and 
users. The specific purposes permitted are: criticism or review;215 parody or 
satire;216 reporting news;217 and research or study.218  
When a court examines whether fair dealing applies in a copyright infringement 
case, a number of considerations will occur. First, the court will consider the 
actual purpose of the use of the music mash-up to determine if it complies with 
one of the specific purposes within the Act. In examining this issue, in addition 
to the actual purpose of the use, the court will question whether the work has 
been commercially distributed and whether the mash-up artist could have easily 
obtained a licence for the works used. Of consideration will be whether the use 
of the music mash-up has resulted in lost income for the copyright owner of the 
works used. As previously discussed, a majority of music mash-ups are 
distributed non-commercially and such works draw upon a large quantity of 
material so that logistically, it would be difficult for a mash-up artist to obtain 
licences from all owners involved. In examining the actual use of the work, the 
court will determine whether the use could be considered to be ‘fair’. This 
determination is a question of degree.219 The test is to be judged from the 
perspective of a fair-minded and honest person.220  
214 The specific questions posed about fair use are ‘Question 52. Should the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) be amended to include a broad, flexible exception? If so, how should this exception be 
framed? For example, should such an exception be based on “fairness”, “reasonableness” or 
something else? Question 53. Should such a new exception replace all or some existing 
exceptions or should it be in addition to existing exceptions?’: ALRC, above n 7, 10. 
215 Copyright Act s 103A (sound recordings/film); s 41 (musical works). 
216 Ibid s 103AA (sound recordings/film); s 41A (musical works). 
217 Ibid s 103B (sound recordings/film); s 42 (musical works). 
218 Ibid s 103C (sound recordings/film); 40 (musical works). 
219 Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84, 94 (Lord Denning). 
220 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 112 (Hely J). 
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When considering the application of the specific purposes to a music mash-up, 
the outlook does not seem very promising. This is because the fair dealing 
provisions are rather restrictive and are only permissible for highly specific 
purposes. Also, the provisions themselves have been drafted in quite a broad 
manner. Therefore they require significant judicial interpretation, which has 
been more inclined to narrowly focus upon the exact purpose of the use, instead 
of whether the use would be considered ‘fair’.221 The judicial application of the 
fair dealing provisions will now be discussed in further detail in relation to 
music mash-ups. 
C Fair Dealing and Music Mash-Ups: Not Very 
Promising 
1 Criticism or Review 
Criticism or review is permitted under ss 103A (audio-visual item) and 41 
(musical work). Under these sections, criticism or review of these works is 
permitted as long as ‘a sufficient acknowledgement’ of the works is made.222 
‘Criticism’ has been found to include the acts of ‘analysing and judging the 
quality of’ or ‘passing judgement as to the merits of something’;223 whereas 
‘review’ has been found to mean ‘a critique’ — ‘cognate with the word 
“criticism” … one is the process and the other is the result’.224 ‘Sufficient 
acknowledgement’ has been described as ‘an acknowledgement identifying the 
work by its title or other description and … also identifying the author’.225 
In the case of TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd,226 the Full 
Court of the Federal Court had to decide whether the fair dealing exceptions for 
criticism or review and reporting news were applicable to a television program 
which broadcast and light-heartedly discussed a number of other broadcasters’ 
clips. This case occurred prior to the introduction of the fair dealing exceptions 
for parody or satire, so that defence was unavailable at the time. 
221 Kimberlee Weatherall and Emily Hudson, Response to the Attorney-General’s Department 
Issues Paper, Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions in the Digital Age (2005) 10 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/Documents/p150%20IPRIA%201.PDF>. 
222 Copyright Act ss 41, 103A. 
223 De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292, 297–302 (Beaumont J) relying 
upon definitions from the Macquarie Dictionary. 
224 Macquarie Dictionary, above n 223. 
225 Copyright Act s 10; affirmed in De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292, 
297–302 (Beaumont J). 
226 (2002) 118 FCR 417 (‘The Panel Case’). 
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In relation to fair dealing for the purposes of criticism or review, the court stated 
that the ‘true purpose’ of the re-use needed determining.227 A genuine attempt 
was required at engaging in actual criticism and review of the material 
reproduced, although this need not be balanced.228 Therefore it is insufficient to 
rely upon this defence if a hidden motive exists, such as ‘an attempt to dress up 
the infringement of another’s copyright in the guise of criticism, and so profit 
unfairly from another’s work’.229 As such, fair dealing will fail if trade rivals are 
found to have used a copyright-protected work for their own benefit.230 
In consideration of whether a music mash-up could satisfy fair dealing for the 
purpose of criticism or review, this category is likely to be inapplicable to a 
majority of such works. Although most mash-ups engage in acknowledgement 
of the works that they mash (through identification of the work and artist), most 
do not effectively engage in criticism or review of the material that they mash. 
In order to satisfy criticism or review, a music mash-up would need to 
effectively convey ‘the passing of a judgment’ as to the merits of those 
works.231 It would take an extremely creative music mash-up to be able to 
consider the application of this particular exception and it is unlikely that a 
majority of mash-ups would sufficiently satisfy this use. 
2 Reporting News 
Sections 103B and 42 allow fair dealing for the purpose of, or association with, 
the reporting of news in a newspaper, magazine, similar periodical, 
communication or a film. In relation to an audio-visual item, sufficient 
acknowledgement of the first mentioned audio-visual item must be made.232 
Fair dealing for the purpose of reporting news extends to music that is 
incidentally recorded during news footage; however, this does not extend to any 
extraneous music soundtracks which are later added to this footage.233 The 
reporting of news is not necessarily restricted to current events; rather it may 
extend to older events.234  
227 Ibid 444 [115] (Hely J).  
228 Ibid.  
229 Ibid, relying upon the test stated by Henry LJ in Time Warner Entertainment Co Ltd v Channel 
4 Television Corporation Plc (1993) 28 IPR 459, 468. 
230 The Panel Case (2002) 118 FCR 417, 444 [115] (Hely J), relying upon Hubbard v Vosper 
[1972] 2 QB 84, 93 (Lord Denning). 
231 De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292, 297–302 [43] (Beaumont J). 
232 Copyright Act s 103B(1)(b). 
233 Ibid s 42(2). Broadcaster licensing becomes applicable in this scenario. 
234 Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39, 56 (Mason J); De Garis v 
Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292, 297–302 [46] (Beaumont J). 
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In considering the application of this section to a music mash-up, although the 
mash-up would likely engage in sufficient acknowledgement of its sources, a 
court would need to find that the subject matter had been mashed for the 
purpose of, or to be associated with, the reporting of news in a film. Therefore 
this section would likely be inapplicable to a majority of music mash-ups. 
3 Research or Study 
Fair dealing for the purpose of research or study is permitted by ss 103C and 40 
of the Copyright Act. When considering this purpose, Australian courts have 
applied a restrictive judicial interpretation of the meaning of ‘research or 
study’.235 Therefore accepted uses pertaining to ‘research’ and ‘study’ have 
been found to comply with the standard definitions in the Macquarie 
Dictionary, strongly favouring personal use in education or academia and 
rejecting commercial use.236 
Under s 103C, in determining whether the sound recordings and videos used in 
a music mash-up constitutes fair dealing for the purpose of research or study, a 
number of non-exclusive factors are considered. These include: (a) the purpose 
and character of the dealing;237 the nature of the audio-visual item;238 the 
possibility of obtaining the sound recording within a reasonable time at an 
ordinary commercial cost;239 and the effect of the dealing upon the potential 
market or value of the sound recording.240 Therefore a court may look more 
favourably upon a non-commercial mash-up that has drawn upon many works 
and does not affect the potential market value of the original sound recordings, 
as opposed to a commercial mash-up that competes with the market of original 
works. 
Significantly, where part of a sound recording or video is used, as often occurs 
in a mash-up, the substantiality of the part taken is considered in relation to the 
whole work.241 Once again, in consideration of substantiality, the prospects of 
success for a music mash-up under fair dealing for the purpose of research or 
study appear far fetched. 
235 Sillitoe v McGraw-Hill Book Co (UK) Ltd [1983] FSR 545, 558 (Davies J); De Garis v Neville 
Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 37 FCR 99, [32]–[33] (Beaumont J). 
236 De Garis v Neville Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 37 FCR 99, [32]–[33] (Beaumont J). 
237 Copyright Act s 103C(2)(a). 
238 Ibid s 103C(2)(b). 
239 Ibid s 103C(2)(c). 
240 Ibid s 103C(2)(d). 
241 Ibid s 103C(2)(e). 
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4 Parody or Satire –– a More Promising Defence for Mash-
Ups 
As previously stated, following the findings from the Fair Use Issues Paper by 
the Attorney-General’s Department,242 the parody and satire exception to 
copyright infringement was introduced to the Copyright Act on 11 December 
2006 via the Copyright Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). Currently, the Copyright 
Act does not define what constitutes a parody or satire, although it is likely that 
a court would consider the standard dictionary definitions of these terms. The 
information sheet provided by the Australian Copyright Council provides the 
standard Macquarie Dictionary definitions of the terms ‘parody’, ‘burlesque’ 
and ‘satire’ for guidance.243 The information provided states that a parody is ‘an 
imitation of a work that may include parts of the original’, the purpose of which 
is to ‘make some comment on the imitated work or on its creator’.244 In 
comparison, satire draws ‘attention to characteristics or actions — such as vice 
or folly — by using certain forms of expression — such as irony, sarcasm and 
ridicule’.245 
In considering whether a mash-up could be considered a fair dealing as a parody 
or satire, it would depend on the exact content of the mash-up as to whether it 
could fall under s 103AA or s 41A. Mash-ups usually mash small quantities of 
sound recordings together, so this may present challenges as to whether the 
mash-up as a whole could be considered a parody or satire. Also, generally the 
problem with any musical parody or satire is that the new work has to bear some 
resemblance to the original so that it is recognisable by an audience, otherwise 
the parody or satire becomes lost.246 This presents a problem from an 
infringement point of view because once again the court has to consider the 
substantiality test, where many mash-ups would likely fail.  
In conclusion, theoretically, under Australian law, if a mash-up artist created a 
work that was found to constitute a parody or satire, then such a work may 
avoid copyright infringement under fair dealing. It must be remembered though 
that in order for fair dealing to be satisfied, the second limb of the test must also 
be satisfied. Therefore each portion of all the works used would need to be 
found to be less than a substantial part of the original work. This seems 
unlikely, particularly in consideration of what constitutes a mash-up (multiple 
recognisable snippets of works) and how they are created (via layering and 
242 Attorney-General’s Department, above n 212.  




246 Priscilla Blackadder, Copyright: Parody is a Defence but it is No Laughing Matter (LLB Hons 
Thesis, University of New England, 2008) 13. 
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blending). In summation, the prospects of the success of a finding of fair dealing 
by parody or satire in a music mash-up seem rather unlikely; however, it would 
depend on the exact mash-up in question. 
5 Transformative Use 
In the United States, the re-use of music or sound recordings are more likely to 
satisfy the fair use exception to infringement if the new work is a parody of the 
original and it is found to be sufficiently transformative in nature.247 The 
concept of being transformative creates a new and therefore entirely different 
work from the original work and is considered under the first factor in 
considering fair use – ‘the purpose and character of the use’. Being found to 
have created a transformative work strengthens support for a finding of fair use: 
‘[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of 
other factors that may weigh against a finding of fair use.’248 The United States 
Supreme Court case of Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc249 provided an 
explanation of transformative use and a discussion of parody under the fair use 
doctrine. In this case, the court considered whether 2 Live Crew’s raunchy rap 
work titled Pretty Woman was a parody of Roy Orbison’s Oh, Pretty Woman.  
The court found that 2 Live Crew’s work was transformative enough as a 
parody to constitute fair use.250 In examining the extent to which a work must be 
transformative, the court stated that the new work must ‘add[s] something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression meaning or message’.251 Additionally, transformative benefit was 
conferred by the parody, in that it provided a social benefit ‘by shedding light 
on an earlier work, and in the process, creating a new one’.252  
Although transformative use is not currently considered when determining fair 
dealing under Australian law, the question as to whether music mash-ups could 
be considered to be a transformative work is an interesting one. Depending on 
the music mash-up in question, this could be argued both ways; it ultimately 
depends on the level of creative innovation or originality displayed in the actual 
mash-up process. Many mash-ups would be considered transformative because 
247 Arewa, above n 19, 576; Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc, 510 US 569 (1994); Dr Suess 
Enterprises v Penguin Books USA Inc, 109 F 3d 1394 (9th Cir, 1997); Sun Trust v Houghton 
Mifflin, 268 F 3d 1257 (11th Cir, 2001). 
248 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc, 510 US 569, 579 (1994). 
249 510 US 569 (1994). 
250 Ibid 581. 
251 Ibid 579. 
252 Ibid. 
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they convey ‘new meaning, new understandings, or the like [to the listener]’.253 
Therefore such a work is transformative because it performs a different function 
when compared to the old works that it has mashed.254 On the other hand, some 
mash-ups may not be considered to be sufficiently transformative due to the 
way in which they present their material. For example, a mash-up that blends 
just two works together by drawing on significant qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of both works may not be considered transformative enough to 
sufficient convey new meaning to the listener and be classified as a 
transformative work. 
In the ALRC’s Inquiry into Copyright and the Digital Economy Issues Paper, 
the term ‘transformative’ is used ‘to refer generally to [non-commercial or 
commercial] works that transform pre-existing works to create something new 
and that is not merely a substitute for the pre-existing work’.255 This paper 
highlights that, in 2011, the Copyright Council Expert Group recommended that 
an exception be introduced to the Act for ‘private, non-commercial, 
transformative uses’.256 Five specific questions have been asked about some 
substantive issues regarding transformative use.257 Whether music mash-ups 
would be considered transformative works and an exception to copyright 
infringement under future Australian copyright law is yet to be determined. 
253 UMG Recordings Inc v MP3.com Inc, 92 F Supp 2d 349, 351 (SD NY, 2000). 
254 Suntrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Company, 268 F 3d 1257 (11th Cir, 2001). 
255 ALRC, above n 7, 36 [112]. 
256 Ibid 38 [126], citing Copyright Council Expert Group, Directions in Copyright Reform in 
Australia (31 October 2011) Australian Copyright Council 2 
<http://www.copyright.org.au/pdf/Copyright%20Council%20Expert%20Group%20-
%20Paper%202011.pdf>. 
257 The specific questions posed about transformative use are: ‘Question 14. How are copyright 
materials being used in transformative and collaborative ways — for example, in “sampling”, 
“remixes” and “mashups”. For what purposes — for example, commercial purposes, in creating 
cultural works or as individual self-expression? Question 15. Should the use of copyright 
materials in transformative uses be more freely permitted? Should the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
be amended to provide that transformative use does not constitute an infringement of copyright? 
If so, how should such an exception be framed? Question 16. How should transformative use be 
defined for the purposes of any exception? For example, should any use of a publicly available 
work in the creation of a new work be considered transformative? Question 17. Should a 
transformative use exception apply only to: (a) non-commercial use; or (b) use that does not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the copyright material and does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of the copyright? Question 18. The Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) provides authors with three “moral rights”: a right of attribution; a right against false 
attribution; and a right of integrity. What amendments to provisions of the Act dealing with 
moral rights may be desirable to respond to new exceptions allowing transformative or 
collaborative uses of copyright material?’: ALRC, Copyright and the Digital Economy, above 
n 7, 38–9. 
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V  CONCLUSIONS 
In Australia under the Copyright Act, when a mash-up artist currently re-uses 
copyright-protected music in a work without permission, prima facie, they are 
committing copyright infringement. Therefore the apparent situation under 
Australian law is that currently no provisions exist that legalise a majority of 
works created under the music mash-up genre. Music mash-ups may also 
infringe an author’s moral rights, particularly the right of integrity, so mash-up 
artists need to be aware of this when mashing their works. 
When considering whether any of the fair dealing provisions may apply to a 
music mash-up, due to the purposive and rather closed nature of these 
provisions and their rather limited judicial application, it is unlikely that any 
would apply. However, in relation to the parody or satire exception, it would 
depend on the musicological nature of the mash-up in question. Of 
consideration would be the way in which the works were mashed and whether 
this use was determined to be fair.  
Unlike the United States, in Australia, when considering the fair dealing 
exceptions, transformative use (ie whether the work would be considered 
significantly transformative when compared to the original work) is not 
considered. Therefore in the United States, some music mash-ups may be 
considered to be sufficiently transformative to satisfy fair use that would not 
currently satisfy fair dealing in Australia. Resultantly, under current Australian 
law, a mash-up appears to have, at best, a rather poor outlook at avoiding a 
finding of copyright infringement. 
The digital age brings many new challenges to copyright law. One of the 
challenges due to the advancement of technology has been a heightened and 
permanent accessibility to digitalised music via the internet. Millions of people 
around the world now have the opportunity and means to mash-up their 
favourite works (including sound recordings and videos). If it is assumed that 
the Copyright Act should be amended to accommodate these permanent and 
increasing music mash-up practices within Australia, the question becomes 
exactly how. In light of this escalating issue, perhaps the Act could be amended 
to include a specific copyright infringement exception provision that legalises 
the creation of non-commercial music mash-ups, as long as: (1) they are not 
distributed for profit; and (2) they acknowledge all works utilised. Alternatively, 
mash-ups may be legalised in provisions pertaining to the creation of 
transformative works, or under some type of broader fair use provision. 
In late 2013, it will be interesting to observe whether any of the 
recommendations made by the ALRC’s Inquiry into Copyright and the Digital 
Economy will be applicable to music mash-ups.  
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If any recommendations are made which pertain to music mash-ups, it will also 
be interesting to observe the scope and nature of the suggested reform. Only 
time will tell as to whether Australian law will be amended to ‘catch up’ with 
the increasing popularity and widespread nature of music mash-up creation, 
through the legalisation of this technological and creative practice. 
  
 
